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Abstract
Both popular opinion and existing research suggest that money is the key predictor of interest
group lobbying activity. However, this new research on interest group lobbying argues that the
decision to spend money on lobbying is dependent on a range of resources, not just organizational
wealth. Using a sample containing organizations that did and did not make lobbying expenditures
in the 1998 election cycle, it shows how interest group resources explain differences in lobbying
behavior among organizations with similar political goals. Despite the fact that both advocacy
groups and labor unions seek electoral goals like getting new legislators into office, advocacy
groups are less likely to spend money on lobbying than labor unions. In addition, firms are less
likely to spend money on lobbying than trade associations, even though both types of groups pri-
marily seek access to legislators. The availability of interest group resources, such as a committed
membership and organizational experience, helps explain these differences in behavior. These
findings suggest that fears about the corrupting influence of money on politics may be overstated.
KEYWORDS: Interest Groups, Lobbying
∗Dorie Apollonio is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, San Francisco. She re-
ceived a Ph.D. in Political Science in December 2002 from the University of California, Berkeley,
and holds a Master in Public Policy degree from Harvard University. Her research focuses on
interest group politics and campaign finance.
Popular opinion views interest group lobbying as fundamentally unsavory, 
and a means by which moneyed groups inappropriately influence government. In 
contrast, legislators, interest groups, and political scientists view lobbying as a 
critical component of political representation. These two competing theories most 
frequently become relevant in discussions of lobbying spending by interest 
groups. Evidence showing that interest groups spend thousands or millions of 
dollars on lobbying is often taken as proof that the political system is 
fundamentally corrupt, because only organizations that are already wealthy can 
afford to lobby. 
However, very little research has shown what leads interest groups to spend 
money on lobbying in the first place, including the question of whether 
organizational wealth is a factor. Only a limited number of studies consider the 
lobbying behavior of organizations, though many attempt to document how much 
groups spend on campaign contributions (for some exceptions, see Hansen and 
Mitchell 2000, Hojnacki 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Holyoke 2003; 
Kollman 1998; and Wright 1990). The limited research on lobbying spending is 
particularly surprising given how much is spent. Before the passage of the 1995 
Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), which dramatically increased disclosure of 
lobbying expenditures, lobbying expenditures in the 1986 election cycle were 
conservatively estimated to be $110 million (Wright 1990), comparable to PAC 
expenditures of $105 million. After the institution of the 1995 LDA, lobbying 
expenditures were reported to be almost $2.6 billion in the 1998 election cycle 
(the first full cycle under the new reporting requirements), compared to $207 
million of PAC contributions.1
Scholars tend to focus on three explanations for interest group spending on 
politics: organizational goals, political context and resources. The theory that 
receives the most attention emphasizes organizational goals. Typically, groups are 
divided into two types: organizations with access goals and organizations with 
electoral goals (Sorauf 1992; Herrnson 2000). Access-oriented groups make 
political contributions in order to build relationships with legislators, in the 
expectation that those legislators will advocate for the groups’ goals (Langbein 
1986; Hall and Wayman 1990). In contrast, electorally motivated groups direct 
their contributions to challengers and candidates for open seats who already 
support interest group goals, in an effort to change the party in power or the 
composition of the legislature (Eismeier and Pollack 1988; Gopoian 1984; 
Humphries 1991; Wilcox 1994). Ample evidence supports the claim that interest 
group goals affect the contribution levels of political action committees (PACs) 
formed by corporations and labor unions (Eismeier and Pollack 1988; Endersby 
and Munger 1992; Epstein 1969; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991, 1993; Grier, 
Munger, and Roberts 1994; Handler and Mulkern 1982; Masters and Zardoohi 
1988).  
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A second explanation of organizational spending views interest groups as 
strategic actors that modify their behavior in response to political or 
environmental context (Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Hansen 1991). Organizations 
may change the nature or level of their political spending as a reaction to an 
inauspicious issue environment (Eismeier and Pollack 1986, 1988; Handler and 
Mulkern 1982), the party holding a political majority (Rudolph 1999; Cox and 
Magar 1999), legislators’ committee assignments (Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; 
Munger 1989), perceptions of member power (Grentzke 1989) and changes in 
party positions (Jacobson and Kernell 1981). Interest groups may also change 
their spending in response to actions of organizations that are active on the same 
issues (Conybeare and Squire 1994; Gray and Lowery 1997; Hart 2001; Masters 
and Keim 1985).  
Finally, some research considers how group resources affect organizational 
behavior. Organizational resources are relevant to some kinds of organizational 
decision-making, particularly regarding the ways that organizations maintain 
themselves (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Rozell and Wilcox 1998; Berry 1997; 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Wright 1996), but very few studies 
test the relationship between resources and political spending. Studies that 
consider interest group resources typically restrict the discussion to the 
relationship between financial resources and the level of political spending 
(Masters and Keim 1985; Wilcox 1989), or to a proxy for financial resources such 
as the employees or members of an organization who have been solicited for 
funds (Conybeare and Squire 1994; Delaney et al. 1988; Masters and Keim 1985). 
Consistent with popular theories about wealth and political corruption, these 
studies presume that financial wealth translates directly to political spending.  
Much of this research fails to consider the extent to which non-financial 
resources influence strategic behavior. Organizations may have large 
memberships, special legal status, or useful knowledge, and these kinds of 
resources may be substitutes for money. It may be more effective for an 
organization to use members to generate grassroots activity (by having members 
send letters or make phone calls to representatives) or to draw on specialized 
knowledge (by testifying at congressional hearings or government panels) than it 
would be to hire lobbyists. In short, organizations that control non-financial 
resources may not need to rely on money to gain political influence. 
Previous studies of lobbying have addressed this point by considering how 
non-financial resources affect lobbying tactics. For example, membership 
resources shape the capacity for grassroots advocacy (Austen-Smith and Wright 
1994; Hojackni and Kimball 1999; Wright 1990). Research also suggests that 
access to coalitions in Washington influences organizational behavior (Berry 
1977, 1997; Hojackni 1997; Hula 1995; Ornstein and Elder 1978; Schlozman and 
Tierney 1986). Collectively, the literature on lobbying illustrates that 
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organizational political behavior is not simply a product of financial wealth but a 
function of the mix of resources available to an organization.  
 
Theory and expectations 
 
This paper reviews the decision to spend money on lobbying by examining the 
effect of three different kinds of resources: (1) wealth, (2) membership and (3) 
experience. In addition, it considers interest group goals as a factor in explaining 
lobbying spending. 
As existing research suggests, the wealthiest organizations should spend the 
most on lobbying. However, if organizations possess other kinds of resources, 
such as members or political experience, they may spend less money on lobbying. 
For advocacy groups, membership is a key resource for gaining credibility among 
legislators (Wright 1996) and mobilizing grassroots support (Hojackni and 
Kimball 1999). Groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the 
Sierra Club both lobby and mobilize members of their organization during 
electoral campaigns by sending political mail and newsletters, and contacting 
members by telephone (Magleby 2002). For these groups, there is a trade-off 
between spending money on contacting legislators and mobilizing members. The 
less these organizations spend on communication to inform and excite members, 
the less support they receive (Delaney et al. 1988). As a result, membership 
organizations should be less likely to make lobbying expenditures than non-
membership groups, which cannot rely on grassroots support.  
The type of interest group membership should also affect the decision to hire 
lobbyists. Membership in an organization can be voluntary or involuntary. Labor 
union membership is primarily involuntary, because individuals do not usually 
have a choice to join a union if they pursue certain occupations. Membership dues 
for labor unions are traditionally deducted automatically from individual 
paychecks, and these involuntary contributions also make it fairly easy for labor 
unions to raise money (Wilson 1995). In contrast, membership in a citizen 
advocacy group is primarily voluntary because individuals choose to join, usually 
out of a desire to support policy goals.2 Advocacy groups must solicit dues from 
existing and potential members who decide for themselves at regular intervals 
whether or not to support the organization (Wilson 1995). Voluntary membership 
groups should be less likely to spend money on lobbying because these 
organizations emphasize mobilizing members. In addition, advocacy groups, 
when they choose to lobby, may spend less, because many advocacy groups claim 
nonprofit status, meaning that the amount they can spend on lobbying is limited 
by tax law.3
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Organizations without members, primarily firms, have different incentives. 
Unlike advocacy groups, labor unions, and trade and professional organizations, 
which are often nonprofit organizations, firms pursue profits by selling products 
to customers, and their customers do not view themselves as part of the firm. With 
a few exceptions, the political activities of a firm are irrelevant to the question of 
whether or not customers buy their products. Most of the time, businesses wish to 
be left alone politically (Rosenthal 2001), and as a result firms have a limited 
commitment to lobbying. 
The third type of resource is organizational experience. Over time, 
organizations build political relationships, learn new tactics, and improve their 
political abilities. Some organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor 
(now the AFL-CIO), have been active in politics for over a hundred years. Others, 
like Microsoft, are relative newcomers. Organizations tend to pursue multiple 
strategies to secure political goals as they age and learn (March and Olsen 1984). 
As a result, older groups should be more likely to hire lobbyists.  
 
Data and methods 
 
Recent changes in disclosure law regarding lobbying activities offer the ability 
both to measure lobbying expenditures and to distinguish between in-house and 
contract lobbying expenditures. Hired lobbyists are often viewed as engaging in a 
single type of activity. However, groups may purchase at least two major kinds of 
lobbying4: groups can hire their own lobbyists (in-house lobbying), or they can 
engage the services of a lobbying firm to lobby on their behalf (contract 
lobbying). In-house lobbying by an organization is a commitment that is less 
responsive to political context, like whether an important bill is under 
consideration in a given year, because employees cannot be hired and fired on a 
month-by-month basis. In contrast, contract lobbying is done by outside firms, 
which work for a variety of organizations whose needs vary over time, in part due 
to the fact that some issues appear only rarely on the Congressional agenda. 
Reviewing reports filed under the 1995 LDA reveals that many organizations 
contract for lobbying with outside firms in one year, but do not renew these 
contracts in the next. 
Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, groups must disclose how 
expenditures were made. The 1998 election cycle was the first complete election 
cycle that contains detailed information on organizational expenditures by type of 
lobbying. This paper reviews the activity of a sample of organizations active in 
politics at the national level in the 1998 election cycle drawn from Washington 
Representatives5, which catalogs all interest groups involved in national politics. 
The ten-percent simple random sample of 1,066 organizations included firms and 
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associations (trade associations, voluntary organizations, professional groups, 
public interest groups, or labor unions), with each group making up 
approximately forty-five percent of the data, and governments making up the 
remaining ten percent.6 Detailed information on organizational background, 
resources, and political expenditures was drawn from a range of organizational 
directories and campaign finance databases.7
Organizational revenues serve as the measure for interest group wealth in this 
analysis. The variable measuring revenues should be positively correlated with 
the decision to make lobbying expenditures. In addition, measures of 
organizational size may be correlated with the decision to spend on lobbying. 
Employee size represents the real or potential pool of donors from which a group 
can seek contributions (Conybeare and Squire 1994), and for a firm, the 
individuals that might be affected by a particular policy. The number of 
employees also serves as measure of membership size for associations.8
In this analysis, advocacy groups and labor unions are identified as 
membership groups, and firms are identified as non-membership groups. Since 
membership activity can substitute for paid lobbying, the variables advocacy 
group and labor union should be negatively correlated with the decision to spend 
money on lobbying. Firms, however, should be more likely to make lobbying 
expenditures, and to prefer contract lobbyists. Firms, advocacy groups, labor 
unions, and trade associations were identified based on their Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, the general accepted measure indicating the type of 
economic activity that organizations engage in, whether they are for-profit or non-
profit.9 Trade and professional organizations, in addition to social service 
associations such as civic and fraternal groups, typically occupy theoretical 
territory somewhere between firms and membership organizations in the 
discussion of organizational behavior. As a result, trade and professional groups 
are always used as the reference group in the following analysis.
Experience was measured by calculating the age of the organization. Data on 
organizational age is available from a range of sources, including Associations 
Unlimited and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Interest groups in the 
sample spanned a wide range of ages, from five years to over 150 years. The size 
of the interest group population in the same issue area (which was derived by 
counting the number of organizations with the same SIC code) served as a control 
for political context. Individual organizations may make decisions about whether 
or not to participate based on their expectations about similarly situated 
organizations (Olson 1965). Some research suggests that groups participate less as 
the population increases (Conybeare and Squire 1994, Masters and Keim 1985), 
and other research suggests the opposite effect (Gray and Lowery 1997).  
Data for the dependent variable, lobbying expenditures, comes from the 
Center for Responsive Politics’ (CRP) database on all lobbying expenditures 
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reported in the 1998 election cycle under the new reporting restrictions. 
Comparison data on hard money and soft money spending were taken from 
Federal Election Commission and CRP databases.  
To explain which groups spent money on lobbying, the analysis is divided 
into two parts. The first part considers whether the group chose to hire lobbyists at 
all, and more specifically, whether organizations retained in-house lobbyists or 
contract lobbyists. The second part identifies the level of lobbying expenditures 
using OLS regression for groups that had hired in-house lobbyists.10 The level of 
spending on contract lobbying is not discussed in this paper.11 
Characteristics of lobbying expenditures 
 
Overall, interest groups of almost every type spent dramatically more on 
lobbying than they did on campaign contributions. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of political spending by type of organization. Consistent with expectations about 
the importance of interest group goals, the kinds of organizations most likely to 
care about access to legislators were also the organizations that made lobbying the 
largest share of their political spending. Firms, trade associations, and 
professional groups all directed more than three-quarters of their political 
spending on lobbying, rather than on contributions to candidates or political 
parties. In contrast, labor unions and, to a lesser extent, advocacy groups 
concentrated a larger share of their resources on campaign contributions, and a 
smaller share on lobbying. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of average political spending, by organizational type 
 Lobbying Hard Money Soft Money
Firms $283,000 85% $27,000 8% $21,000 7%
Trade Associations $440,000 90% $37,000 8% $10,000 2%
Professional Groups $143,000 75% $46,000 24% $600 1%
Labor Unions $413,000 34% $694,000 57% $115,000 9%
Advocacy Groups $222,000 63% $127,000 36% $4,000 1%
N=1066. Source: 1998 election cycle lobbying expenditure data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics (CRP) website; classification of groups drawn from author compilation of organizational 
characteristics drawn from a variety of sources listed in the text. Data exclude governments and 
social service agencies. 
 
These descriptive data suggest the importance of interest group goals in 
affecting lobbying behavior. They also point to the relatively large share of 
political spending represented by lobbying, relative to other forms of political 
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spending. Despite the traditional research focus on hard money contributions by 
political action committees to measure interest group activity, the overwhelming 
majority of groups direct their most of their money toward lobbying, rather than 
campaign contributions.  
More than half of the organizations considered spent money on some form of 
lobbying, but the percentage of participating groups changes dramatically by 
organizational type. Firms were most likely to make lobbying expenditures, with 
57% spending, while only a third of advocacy groups made lobbying 
expenditures. As expected, contract lobbying was far more popular than in-house 
lobbying. However, the emphasis on contract over in-house lobbying was not 
consistent across all kinds of groups. In Table 2, organizations are listed by type, 
ranging from those most commonly engaging in lobbying spending to those that 
were least commonly observed lobbying; in order, these are firms, trade 
associations, professional groups, labor unions, and advocacy groups. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the lobbying population, 1997-1998 
All organizations 
Percentage 
lobbying
Percentage hiring 
in-house lobbyists
Percentage hiring 
contract lobbyists
Firms  57% 13% 55%
Trade Associations 55% 31% 46%
Professional Groups 46% 21% 35%
Labor Unions 40% 40% 20%
Advocacy Groups 33% 17% 24%
 
All organizations 51% 16% 46%
 
Participants only 
Mean lobbying 
spending
Mean in-house 
lobbying spending
Mean contract 
lobbying spending
Firms  $497,521 $1,268,857 $211,840
Trade Associations $806,315 $1,111,055 $216,616
Professional Groups $309,591 $466,301 $127,857
Labor Unions $1,031,250 $1,002,500 $57,500
Advocacy Groups $680,531 $1,110,617 $146,483
 
All organizations $489,050 $1,013,702 $182,605
N=1066. Source: 1998 election cycle lobbying expenditure data from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP) website; classification of groups drawn from author compilation of 
organizational characteristics drawn from a variety of sources listed in the text. Data exclude 
governments and social service agencies. 
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Again, these results are consistent with expectations that suggest that access 
goals lead groups to lobby. Paid lobbying is a means to contact sitting legislators, 
rather than a strategy that can advance electoral goals. As anticipated, a higher 
percentage of firms hired contract lobbyists than any other kind of organization; 
over half of the firms in the sample had hired contract lobbyists. However, firms 
were also the least likely to engage in-house lobbyists; only about one in ten 
(13%) did so. Labor unions showed the opposite pattern, with 40% retaining in-
house lobbyists, and only 20% retaining contract lobbyists. 
Turning to the level of lobbying spending, although more firms hired lobbyists 
than any other kind of organization, firms that did make lobbying expenditures 
spent less than almost any other kind of organization, with an average spending 
level of less than a half-million dollars among participating firms. Only 
professional groups, with average spending of approximately $310,000 among 
participants, spent a lower amount. Participating labor unions spent the most, an 
average of over one million dollars apiece in the 1998 election cycle.  
The average spending by groups that engaged in in-house lobbying was more 
than five times higher than the average spending of groups that engaged in 
contract lobbying. In addition, with the exception of professional groups, the level 
of in-house lobbying spending was relatively constant across participating 
organizations. Groups that engaged in-house lobbyists spent an average of over a 
million dollars each. Contract lobbying expenses varied, but were less than the 
amount spent on in-house lobbying expenses for every type of interest group. The 
scope of these expenditures ranged from less than $60,000 for labor unions to 
over $215,000 for professional groups. 
Building on the descriptive data, a logit regression was used to test whether 
the decision to lobby reflected differences in organizational resources such as 
wealth, membership, and political experience, as well as a measure of political 
context.12 Although the sample size is small, the model correctly classified two-
thirds of cases. Given existing theoretical claims and the descriptive data, it 
seemed likely that advocacy groups would be less likely to lobby than other kinds 
of organizations. As anticipated, the decision to make lobbying expenditures 
depended primarily on membership characteristics. Advocacy groups were 
significantly less likely to make lobbying expenditures than other types of 
organizations. 
Labor unions, however, were just as likely to make lobbying expenditures as a 
baseline trade or professional organization. This result is inconsistent with 
research suggesting that organizational goals affect whether or not groups lobby. 
As discussed above, this finding suggests that organizational resources, such as 
the voluntary nature of membership in an advocacy group, are also relevant to 
interest group decision-making. Members that can be easily mobilized offer the 
best alternative to paid lobbyists.13 The findings in Table 2 revealed that a high 
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percentage (40%) of labor unions hired in-house lobbyists, relative to advocacy 
groups (17%). Labor unions, thanks to a less ideological relationship with their 
membership, may have a need for in-house lobbyists, unlike many advocacy 
organizations. One theory, discussed above, predicts that organizational behavior 
can be explained by whether or not groups pursue electoral goals, and assumes as 
a result that labor unions and advocacy groups will engage in similar activities. 
However, these groups’ different memberships appear to be at least as much of a 
factor in predicting their behavior.  
Advocacy groups are far less likely to hire lobbyists than other kinds of 
organizations. However, it also appears that firms are less likely to use in-house 
lobbyists than comparable trade and professional organizations. Based on the logit 
coefficients in the model, the baseline trade and professional organization in the 
sample had a 43% probability of engaging in-house lobbyists, and firms had a 
30% probability of doing so, compared to only 15% of advocacy groups. In 
contrast, firms were more likely to engage contract lobbyists than other kinds of 
organizations. Trade and professional organizations had a 47% probability of 
engaging contract lobbyists, but the probability of a firm doing so was 74%, an 
increase of over one-half. The preference of firms for contract lobbying and 
against in-house lobbying was obscured in the analysis of total lobbying spending. 
It is critical to distinguish the type of lobbying to assess the importance of 
organizational resources. Once again, interest group goals appear to tell only part 
of the story. Firms behave like trade and professional organizations in the analysis 
of overall spending, but needing access to legislators is not the sole factor 
explaining lobbying behavior.  
Hiring in-house lobbyists requires that interest groups make a long-term 
commitment to their employees and to trying to influence the legislature. This 
commitment is reflected in the expectation that organizations will be more likely 
to hire in-house lobbyists as they age. As anticipated, experienced organizations 
were far more likely to hire in-house lobbyists than inexperienced organizations. 
An organization that was ten years old had a 27% chance of engaging in-house 
lobbyists, and an organization with 50 years of history behind it had a 34% 
probability of using its own in-house lobbyists, an increase of nearly a third. 
Similarly, an organization with 100 years of experience increased its probability 
of engaging in-house lobbyists to 44%.  
Non-financial resources are clearly not the only factor affecting lobbying 
spending, but these results suggest that such resources have an important 
influence on interest group decisions. Both the popular expectation that 
underlying wealth drives lobbying spending and the research expectation that 
lobbying spending is driven by organizational goals are incomplete. Proposed 
legislative changes often affect a wide variety of organizations, but despite the 
fact that millions of interest groups are affected by proposed or actual changes in  
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Table 3. Predictors of the decision to make lobbying expenditures 
All  
lobbying 
In-house 
lobbying 
Contract 
lobbying 
 
Coefficient 
 (s.e.) 
Coefficient 
 (s.e.) 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
 
Revenues (in billions of dollars) 0.053 0.052 0.056 
(0.071) (0.039) (0.063) 
Employees (in thousands) -0.004 -0.013 -0.012 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.023) 
Firm (dummy variable) 0.605 -0.602* 1.21***
(0.402) (0.365) (0.39) 
Labor Union (dummy variable) -1.109 -0.56 -0.392 
(1.24) (1.272) (1.243) 
Advocacy Group (dummy variable) -1.332*** -1.535*** -0.905** 
 (0.434) (0.566) (0.448) 
Organizational Age (dummy variable) 0.001 0.009** -0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Population (in millions of groups) 2.192 -2.527 2.656 
(2.554) (2.466) (2.602) 
Constant 0.225 -0.599 -0.229 
(0.358) (0.354) (0.357) 
N 241 241 241 
Log Likelihood -146.71 -146.7 -149.75 
Pseudo R2 .09 .07 .10 
Note: Figures are logit regression coefficients (Stata-generated). Dependent variable is whether an 
organization made lobbying expenditures. * p<.10  ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Source: 1998 election cycle lobbying expenditure data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) 
website; classification of groups drawn from author compilation of organizational characteristics drawn 
from a variety of sources listed in the text. Data exclude governments and social service agencies. 
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the political environment, only a few thousand groups ever attempt to influence 
legislators by hiring lobbyists. Measures of non-financial resources suggest why 
certain groups spend money on politics while other groups do not.  
Moreover, focusing on non-financial resources helps explain why groups with 
similar goals behave differently. Organizations with resources such as a 
committed membership that can be mobilized to contact legislators directly are 
less likely to hire lobbyists. In contrast, organizations that have more experience 
are more likely to hire their own lobbyists. Finally, consistent with their relatively 
limited and occasional interest in politics, firms are most likely to engage contract 
lobbyists. 
The factors that explain the decision to spend money on lobbying may also 
have an effect on the level of spending, at least for in-house lobbying. As 
discussed above, two types of resources should be positively correlated with the 
level of spending on in-house lobbying: capital and membership. An OLS 
regression considered the factors that affect the level of spending (the dependent 
variable is spending in dollars) on in-house lobbying, including only 
organizations that made such lobbying expenditures. The results, which are 
presented in Table 4, suggest that both wealth and membership influence the level 
of lobbying spending. As organizational revenues increase, groups spend more on 
in-house lobbying. For every additional billion dollars in revenue possessed by an 
organization, it spends slightly more than $60,000 more on in-house lobbying. 
However, as noted above, the level of underlying financial resources possessed by 
an interest group does not appear to affect the decision to hire lobbyists.  
Surprisingly, advocacy organizations that engaged in-house lobbyists spent 
significantly more than other kinds of organizations. These participating advocacy 
groups spent almost $1.5 million more than a comparable trade or professional 
association. This result is inconsistent with the expectation that advocacy groups 
would spend less due to the tax restrictions on the level of lobbying spending by 
nonprofit groups. The most likely explanation for this result is the relevance of 
organizational goals. Advocacy organizations are seen as having electoral goals 
because they are more likely to focus on polarizing single issues. The relatively 
high level of expenditures once groups choose to spend may reflect the difficulty 
of changing the minds of legislators about controversial issues such as abortion 
and gun rights. When advocacy groups do commit to paid lobbying, they commit 
far more resources to the task than organizations that focus on economic issues 
do. However, although advocacy groups and labor unions share electoral goals, 
they do not make comparable levels of lobbying expenditures. 
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Table 4. Predictors of the level of in-house lobbying spending 
 
Independent variable 
Coefficient  
(s.e.) 
 
Revenues (in billions of dollars) $60,489**
(24,991) 
 
Employees (in thousands) $16,533 
 (15,759) 
 
Firm (dummy variable) $-699,887 
 (535,964) 
 
Labor Union (dummy variable) $1,358,247 
 (1,691,571) 
 
Advocacy Group (dummy variable) $1,468,882* 
 (839,736) 
 
Organizational Age (in years) $1,173 
 (4,872) 
 
Population (in millions of groups) $-4,408 
 (3,602) 
 
Constant $1,031,497**
(439,865) 
 
N 87
R2 0.22  
 
Note: Figures are OLS regression coefficients (Stata-generated). Dependent variable is how much an 
organization spent on in-house lobbying. * p<.10  ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Source: 1998 election cycle lobbying expenditure data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) 
website; classification of groups drawn from author compilation of organizational characteristics drawn from 
a variety of sources listed in the text. Data exclude governments and social service agencies. 
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Discussion 
 
Considering non-financial organizational resources effectively predicts some 
of the lobbying behavior of interest organizations, and helps identify the subset of 
groups that invest in short- and long-term efforts to influence government. 
Political threats faced by organizations may inspire them to become involved in 
politics, but the availability of all kinds of organizational resources suggest why 
certain organizations that face threats mobilize while other organizations facing 
the same threats do not. Membership affects the type and level of lobbying 
activity. Firms are less likely to commit to hire their own lobbying staff, 
preferring instead to rent expertise by retaining contract lobbyists.  
In contrast, although advocacy groups are less likely to make lobbying 
expenditures than other organizations, when they do, they spend more on in-house 
lobbying efforts than other kinds of organizations. Most of the lobbying 
expenditures by advocacy groups are made by wealthy organizations, and their 
commitment to high levels of spending suggests that they may find it difficult to 
convince legislators to change their opinions on controversial issues. Although 
organizations that are active on controversial issues may find it difficult to change 
the minds of legislators, Wright (1996) notes that effective interest group 
lobbying often consists of informing legislators about constituent preferences, and 
convincing them that action on a particular issue would be politically popular. 
The actions that advocacy groups must take to make this case (such as running 
opinion surveys and developing grassroots campaigns) are frequently quite 
expensive. 
Confirming the conventional wisdom about wealthy organizations that face no 
contribution limits, money is an important factor in predicting the level of 
lobbying spending. While this conclusion may seem obvious14, this analysis 
makes an important distinction between the decision to engage in lobbying and 
the level of expenditures that is not often considered in research on political 
spending. Organizational wealth, although important, affects the level of interest 
group spending rather than the decision to lobby in the first place. It appears that 
non-financial resources provide a substitute for paid lobbying in some 
circumstances, although the availability of non-financial resources does not 
necessarily decrease the likelihood that organizations will retain paid lobbyists. 
Although membership organizations that engage in political activity may be less 
likely to spend money on lobbying, interest groups with greater experience are 
more likely to do so.  
The results provided here increase the understanding of interest group 
behavior in a relatively unconstrained political spending environment. Popular 
literature on interest group lobbying concentrates on the risk of corruption, 
13Apollonio: Predictors of Interest Group Lobbying Decisions
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
typically claiming that organizational wealth drives lobbying behavior. Political 
scientists, in contrast, tend to focus primarily on the relevance of interest group 
goals to explain lobbying behavior. However, both these common theories of 
organizational behavior neglect the importance of non-financial resources. 
Considering non-financial resources offers a much more accurate picture of why 
some interest groups lobby while other organizations do not. Moreover, 
recognizing the importance of non-financial resources suggests that concerns 
about the corrupting influence of money on politics may be overstated. 
Organizational wealth is not the only factor that leads groups to lobby legislators, 
and groups that have less money are not necessarily excluded from legislative 
decision-making. 
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1 Lobbying expenditures do not constitute all lobbying activity; and only expenditures than exceed 
$10,000 annually must be reported, meaning that a fair amount of small scale and grassroots 
lobbying is not considered. However, most lobbying activity is undertaken by a small subset of 
lobbyists (Hrebenar 1992; Rosenthal 2001), and in practice many of these lobbyists report 
contracts of less than $10,000. 
2 Membership might include some material inducements to join, but the decision to leave an 
advocacy group can usually be made without incurring substantial costs, such as losing a job. 
3 Nonprofit groups can spend up to 20% of their first $500,000 in expenditures on lobbying, after 
which the percentages that may be devoted to lobbying decrease as expenditures increase. 
4 Hrebenar (1992) classifies lobbyists into five different categories: contract, in-house, 
governmental, citizen, and “hobbyist” lobbyists; classifications that incorporate the nature of the 
interest group and the type of lobbyist. This paper classifies interest groups by type and excludes 
unpaid lobbying; the remaining distinction is whether lobbyists work on contract or in-house. 
5 The source of these data, Washington Representatives, is appropriate to an analysis of lobbying 
(Salisbury et al 1987; Schlozman 1984). The ability to identify organizations that lobby was 
increased by the recent passage of the 1995 LDA; over sixteen percent of the organizations listed 
in 1997 were identified exclusively through their registration under the act. Half of the 
organizations listed reported lobbying expenditures in the 1998 election cycle. Although the 
universe of all organizations would be a superior source from which to draw a sample, sources that 
claim to provide such information are both incomplete and prohibitively expensive.  
6 Governments were excluded from consideration because the variables used in this analysis, as 
well as in prior research, cannot be applied to governments. 
7 Background information on corporations was drawn from Securities and Exchange Commission 
filings, and from public information on firms posted to online business directories. Background 
information on associations (such as founding date, activities, issue areas, membership, dues, total 
budget, employees) was drawn from Associations Unlimited. In addition, public information 
provided by the organizations themselves was added when it was available.  
8 The majority of associations hire staff to perform political work, and staff size increases with the 
size of membership, though there are some economies of scale for larger groups. Attempting to 
simply count the number of organizational members is problematic. Not all organizations have 
members, making comparisons across groups difficult, and many organizations report membership 
figures that include both other organizations and individuals, though these two types of members 
are not comparable. Groups that have other organizations as members frequently report lower 
memberships than groups with individual members, though organizational members may have 
individual members themselves. Finally, membership figures reported by interest groups are 
frequently inflated. 
9 Advocacy groups were classified by their issue area based on secondary SIC codes, or primary 
NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System) code. Trade associations were 
identified by their 4-digit SIC code, as were labor unions and professional organizations. 
10 The two part model is discussed in detail in Manning et al. (1987), which compares it to sample 
selection models and favors the former. Later research by Leung and Yu (1996), although noting 
weaknesses in the earlier research, points to the strength of this model under certain conditions, 
and it appears to be the appropriate choice for these data. 
11 Because contract lobbying can be done on an ad hoc basis, by organizations that may only 
participate occasionally in politics, the predictor of spending on contract lobbying should be 
political context rather than organizational resources. Unfortunately, there are very few accepted 
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measures of what constitutes political context that apply to interest groups themselves rather than 
to the recipients of hard money contributions, and establishing such a set of measures would be 
beyond the scope of a single paper. Also, the levels of expenditures reported on contract lobbying 
are different in character from the levels of expenditures reported for in-house lobbying. Contract 
lobbyists must report all their income from lobbying, but organizations that engage in in-house 
lobbying estimate lobbying expenditures if they do not spend all of their time lobbying (implying 
some ambiguity about the percentage of overhead expenses attributable to lobbying). Variance in 
the level of expenditures on in-house lobbying is probably much greater than it is for contract 
lobbying, and even an implicit comparison between spending levels for each type of activity is 
suspect. When resource variables were tested as predictors of spending on contract lobbying, none 
were significant.  
12 Complete data were not available for all groups in the sample; in particular, many groups did 
not provide their founding date, and some provided no revenues. However, the groups included 
varied widely on the characteristics measured. If there is bias in the sample, it should reflect the 
inclusion of older organizations, suggesting that the true size of any age effect will be attenuated.  
13 Membership groups and firms may view what they must disclose differently, becausegroups 
must report lobbying spending, but not spending on education. Membership groups may perceive 
some of their lobbying to be education, while firms may be more willing to view all of their 
activities as lobbying. This is consistent with the expectation that advocacy groups will spend less 
to retain nonprofit status. However, this effect is most likely to lead to membership groups 
underreporting their levels of lobbying expenditures, rather than failing to report that they made 
expenditures on lobbying at all. As a result, this effect, if it exists, should not bias the results. 
14 As Tversky and Kahneman (1971) note, researchers also tend to accept theoretically intuitive 
results as proven after only limited study, underestimating the value of replicating prior study 
results. However, few studies have attempted to explain the relationship between organizational 
revenues and spending. 
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